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On December 15, 1978 the President of the United States announced
before a nationwide television audience that the United States and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China (PRC) had agreed to establish full diplomatic rela-
tions, effective January 1, 1979. Reaffirming the terms of the Shanghai
Communique,' the President declared that "The government of the United
States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one
China and Taiwan is a part of China." "The United States," the President
said, "recognizes the government of the People's Republic oT China as the
sole legal government of China. Within this context, the people of the
United States will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial rela-
tions with the people of Taiwan."'2
The new United States position with regard to Taiwan (formerly recog-
nized as the Republic of China) received further clarification in the official
United States statement on normalization, which followed soon after:
On ... January 1, 1979, the United States of America will notify Taiwan that it
is terminating diplomatic relations and that the Mutual Defense Treaty between
the United States and the Republic of China is being terminated in accordance
with the provisions of the Treaty. . . .In the future, the American people and the
people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without
official diplomatic relations. The administration will seek adjustments to our
laws and regulations to permit the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and
other non-governmental relationships in the new circumstances that will exist
after normalization. 3
Thus, as 1979 dawned, the United States abandoned a long-standing polit-
ico-military alliance (albeit a fading one) with the Republic of China
(ROC) in favor of a more uncertain, but seemingly inevitable, association
with the PRC.
The abruptness with which this major policy reversal was announced and
the ambiguous nature of United States's new relationship with the ROC has
raised major questions about the future status of Taiwan as an independent
political entity, about the future of United States dealings with Taiwan, and
'United States-People's Republic of China: Joint Communique [February 28, 1972], 11
INT'L LEGAL MATS. 443 (1972).
'Statement of President Jimmy Carter to the Nation, December 15, 1977. Implementation of
the Taiwan Relations Act." Issues and Concerns. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian and
Pacfc Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 133 (1977).
I1d at 134; the treaty referred to in the quote is the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Republic of China, entered intoforce March 3, 1955, T.I.A.S.
No. 3178, 6 U.S.T. 433.
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in particular about the effects of derecognition on the substantial economic
interests which the United States has developed in Taiwan over the last
thirty years. In 1978 Taiwan stood as America's eighth largest trading part-
ner, exporting approximately $5 billion (U.S.) worth of goods to the United
States and importing slightly less than half that amount. Between 1978 and
1985 two-way trade is expected to total $80 billion.4 At the time of United
States normalization with the PRC, direct United States investment in Tai-
wan totaled nearly $500 million (U.S.). More than 100 banks, representing
a broad cross section of the United States banking industry, had extended
more than $2 billion (U.S.) in credit to borrowers on Taiwan, including
private Chinese companies, multinational firms doing business on Taiwan,
and nearly all ROC government agencies, banks and productive enter-
prises. United States government Ex-Im Bank loans totaled another $1.8
billion (U.S.). 5
The concerns of the United States business community and others were
aired in hearings held in February 1979 before the House Foreign Affairs
and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. Under consideration was the
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA),6 the legislation being proposed to implement
domestically the Carter Administration's new China policy. Observing that
"business thrives on certainty," the chairman of the United States Chamber
of Commerce in the Republic of China, Robert Parker, pointed to the
American business community's "paramount" concern with the need for "a
clear and sufficient legal framework for United States investments and
trade with Taiwan."' 7 Similar concerns were expressed by Hon. David Ken-
nedy, Chairman of the United States-Republic of China Economic Coun-
cil. 8
The immediate focus of attention in both the political and business com-
munities was the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the organization
authorized by the TRA to carry on all future relations of a governmental
nature between the United States and the Republic of China. The powers
and authority given to this unique entity and to its Taiwan counterpart, the
Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA), pose signifi-
cant problems of both law and definition. Lack of experience with this new
species of organization mandates new legal formulations which can encom-
pass the new United States-Taiwan relationship and the international
'Statement of Hon. David Kennedy, Chairman, United States-Republic of China Economic
Council. Taiwan Legislation: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Kennedy Statement].
5Statement of Robert P. Parker, President, American Chamber of Commerce, Taipei, Tai-
wan. Taiwan: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.
447 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Parker Statement].
'Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301 et seq.
(1979)).
'See Parker Statement, supra note 5 at 448, 45 1.
'Kennedy Statement, supra note 4 at 74.
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actors it has created. For purposes of discussion, this study will focus pri-
marily on the AIT.
The immediate problem posed by the AIT comes from its unprecedented
nature. Section 6 of the TRA defines the functions of the Institute as fol-
lows:
Sec. 6. (a) Programs, transactions, and other relations conducted or carried
out by the President or any agency of the United States government with respect
to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be
conducted and carried out by or through-
(1) the American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation incorporated
under the laws of the District of Columbia, or
(2) such comparable successor nongovernmental entity as the President may
designate, (hereafter in this Act referred to as the "Institute".)
(b) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States government is
authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to enter
into, perform, enforce, or have in force an agreement or transaction relative to
Taiwan, such agreement or transaction shall be entered into, performed, and
enforced, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, by or through
the Institute.
9
The Act goes on to specify that, in addition, the AIT may authorize its
employees in Taiwan to perform the functions and provide the services of
United States consular officers.' 0 The AIT employees are not, however,
considered to be employees of the United States government."I In theory,
all AIT personnel have been separated from government service for the
duration of their employment at AIT.' 2 The "separation" is transparent,
nevertheless, as all of the former government employees serving with AIT
are paid with United States government-appropriated funds and are enti-
tled upon termination of that service to reinstatement with their original
agency with no loss in rights, privileges, position or benefits.13
The purposes of the AIT are spelled out in more detail in its Articles of
Incorporation, dated January 16, 1979:
The institute is organized to engage exclusively in charitable, educational, and
scientific activities and, in furtherance of such activities (and without limitation):
(a) to enable the American people and the people on Taiwan to maintain com-
mercial, cultural, and other relations without official government representa-
tion or diplomatic relations;
(b) to represent the interests of the United States and its people in conducting
and carrying out programs, transactions, and other relations with the people
on Taiwan;
(c) to enable international agreements and arrangements to be performed and
enforced in a manner consistent with subparagraphs (a) and (b) above; and
'Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301 et seq.
(1979)).
'These include the performance of notarial acts, the taking of oaths, affidavits and deposi-
tions, and acting as provisional conservator of the personal estates of deceased American citi-
zens. Id § 7(a).
"Id § l1(c), 22 U.S.C. § 3310, 93 Stat. 19 (1979).
"Id § 1 (a).
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(d) to perform functions, on behalf of the American people, that would otherwise
be performed by government. 14
In practice, the AIT performs most of the same functions that were previ-
ously performed by the United States Embassy in Taipei. In addition to
consular functions, these include the providing of a normal range of serv-
ices for United States businessmen in Taiwan, such as disseminating infor-
mation and responding to inquiries concerning economic conditions and
investment opportunities. The Institute also processes applications for visas
and passports, although actual issuance is done in nearby diplomatic posts
such as Hong Kong. 15 Funding for the AIT is provided through the annual
State Department appropriation.
The status of the AIT is an anomalous one. It is an unofficial, nongov-
ernmental entity, operating on contract from the Department of State,
staffed by State Department and other United States government personnel
technically "separated" from their parent agencies, yet empowered to (as
stated in the Articles of Incorporation) "perform functions, on behalf of the
American people, that would otherwise be performed by government".
Unique in both form and function, the AIT is without precedent in United
States diplomatic experience.
The Taiwan body which parallels the AIT is the CCNAA. The Washing-
ton office of the CCNAA is the successor to the former Republic of China
embassy in the United States. The CCNAA was established at approxi-
mately the same time and along roughly similar lines as the AIT.
Under the TRA, all dealings between Taiwan and the United States are to
be handled exclusively through these two organizations. As stated in
Section 10(a):
Whenever the President or any agency of the United States government is author-
ized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to render or
provide to or to receive or accept from Taiwan, any performance, communica-
tion, assurance, undertaking, or other action, such action shall, in the manner and
to the extent directed by the President, be rendered to or provided to, or received
or accepted from, an instrumentality established by Taiwan which the President
determines has the necessary authority under the laws applied by the people of
Taiwan to provide assurances and take other actions on behalf of Taiwan in
accordance with this chapter. 16
This formula was rigidly adhered to by the Carter administration. All
transactions and communications of a governmental nature between the
United States and Taiwan were channeled through the AIT and CCNAA
rather than more directly through the concerned agencies of the respective
governments. Under current United States policy, no direct contact was
4Articles of Incorporation of the American Institute on Taiwan. Taiwan.: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 5 at 165.
"See statement of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Taiwan: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 5, at 21.
'
6 Taiwan Relations Act, § 10(a), 22 U.S.C. § 3309, 93 Stat. 18 (1979).
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permitted between American officials and their Taiwan counterparts
outside of the AIT-CCNAA framework.
I
Among the primary functions of the American Institute on Taiwan is the
oversight and enforcement of existing treaties and agreements between the
United States and Taiwan, as well as the negotiation and conclusion of new
agreements. The status of any new agreements between the AIT and
CCNAA, as well as of any other transactions they may undertake, is
assured in United States law through the provisions of the TRA. The lack
of precedent for the AIT-CCNAA relationship thus does not preclude the
legal recognition of agreements made by the two organizations. Though
unofficial in character, agreements between the AIT and CCNAA are bind-
ing between the two entities and, just as executive agreements, are given full
force and effect in the domestic law of the United States. 17
The status of these agreements under international law presents a more
complex case, however. Though of unquestioned validity in the domestic
law of both the United States and Taiwan, such agreements may yet be the
basis of disputes in international forums. From both the American and
Taiwanese standpoints, therefore, there is a need for further clarification of
exactly what the international legal character of these agreements might be.
In approaching this problem, it should be remembered that at the time
diplomatic relations between the United States and Taiwan were severed,
more than fifty-five treaties and agreements between the two countries were
in force. In an executive memorandum dated December 30, 1978, the Presi-
dent, in order to prevent a hiatus in United States-Taiwan relations,
directed that those treaties and agreements should continue to remain in
force despite the lack of diplomatic relations.' 8 This principle was later
incorporated in the TRA, Section 4(c) of which states:
For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States, the Congress
approves the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agree-
ments, including multilateral conventions, entered into by the United States and
the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the
Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in force between them on
December 31, 1978, unless and until terminated in accordance with law.
19
It was the understanding of many members of Congress, based on previous
administration testimony,20 that this meant that all existing treaties and
"
7 See testimony of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., November 8, 1979 at 15 in unpub-
lished transcript.
"
8Memorandum of December 30, 1978. Taiwan: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, supra note 5 at 163.
"Taiwan Relations Act, § 4(c), 8 U.S.C. 1152, 93 Stat. 16 (1979).
"'See Taiwan: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 5 at 15,
19, 49, 82; Taiwan Legislation: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra
note 4 at 3, 7; Implementation ofthe Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 2, at vi, 12.
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agreements with Taiwan would remain intact for an indefinite period,
unless and until clear necessity dictated otherwise. Considerable alarm was
caused, then, when in the fall of 1979 Vice-President Walter Mondale
announced in Peking that the United States would negotiate a civil aviation
agreement with the People's Republic of China and would renegotiate the
existing agreement with Taiwan. Notice of termination was subsequently
given Taiwan, and steps were taken by the United States to replace that
agreement with a new "unofficial arrangement more appropriate" to the
changed United States-Taiwan relationship.
This move by the Carter administration raised the spectre of a wholesale
elimination or downgrading of the remaining United States-Taiwan treaties
and agreements-a development contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of
the TRA. Fear that this was an unannounced administration policy led to
hearings before both the House and Senate in November 1979, in which
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher presented the State Depart-
ment's conclusion that of the fifty-five existing treaties and agreements with
Taiwan, (a) fourteen were fully executed or inactive; (b) six were related to
the Mutual Defense Treaty and were therefore terminated with that treaty;
(c) two nonmilitary agreements had been rendered moot by the severance
of diplomatic relations; (d) twenty-nine concerned active programs-such
as agreements on education, fisheries, investment, and postal affairs--or
contained provisions of continuing relevance (no alteration of these agree-
ments was anticipated); and (e) five agreements, including the Civil Avia-
tion Agreement, required immediate attention by way of alteration.
Christopher assured the Congress that "we do not have a policy to convert
or terminate all of the treaties and agreements we maintain with Taiwan.
Each agreement, as the circumstances require, will be considered on its own
merits, on a case-by-case basis." Christopher also went on to observe, how-
ever, that "after further review, if changing circumstances warrant, we may
wish to take further action with respect to certain other segments of our
agreements. '21 These assurances of the continuation in force of at least
twenty-nine agreements do not, therefore, preclude revision or termination
of those agreements in the future.
With reference to those treaties and agreements which are allowed to
stand undisturbed, the United States has stated that it "would find no diffi-
culty . . . in treating the people on Taiwan as a valid treaty partner for
purposes of important treaties, such as aviation agreements, and nuclear
supply arrangements which now exist."'22 New procedures are called for,
however, when changes in an existing agreement (such as the Air Transport
Agreement) are required or when an entirely new agreement needs to be
negotiated. In either case negotiations will, as already noted, be carried out
through the AIT and CCNAA, with the sponsorship of the appropriate
2 Testimony of Warren Christopher, supra note 17 at 12.
22Testimony of Warren Christopher, Taiwan: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, supra note 5, at 49.
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United States government departments or agencies. Circular 175 proce-
dures of the Department of State will be followed. Signature is to be by
and in the name of the AIT and CCNAA, and the resulting agreement will
be entirely unofficial.
Policy regarding which agreements will be terminated or amended will
be governed by the following criteria. If, as circumstances change over
time, an agreement is believed to require updating or modification, the
problem will be approached on a case-by-case basis. If "overall" or major
changes in the agreement are required, it is the clear preference of the State
Department that the existing agreement be terminated or allowed to lapse,
and that a new "unofficial arrangement" be negotiated (this is what hap-
pened in the case of the Air Transport Agreement). If only relatively minor
modifications are anticipated, such as the changing of a date, a paragraph,
or a single provision, this will be done by a "letter of agreement" between
the AIT and CCNAA which will be appended to the underlying document.
In this case, the underlying agreement will remain in full force and effect,
except as modified by the letter. 23
Under this arrangement, a formal, official agreement or treaty between
two governments will coexist in a single legal unit with an overlaid, unoffi-
cial document of agreement between two ostensibly private corporations. It
is the status of the informal "letter of agreement" which poses the most
difficult problem for international law. Despite the unprecedented nature
of this arrangement, both logic and an examination of authorities suggests
that such agreements can in fact occupy a place within the international
legal framework.
II
One chain of legal authority for these agreements flows directly from the
interrelation of the letter overlay with the underlying treaty. If the treaty is
held to be valid, then clearly a legal relationship must exist between that
treaty and the letter by which it is amended. Absent such a legal relation-
ship, the treaty could not be said to be changed. Recognition given to the
changes embodied in the letter necessarily implies, therefore, recognition of
the international legal status of not only the Treaty but also of the letter
itself.
Another more clear chain of international legal authority for agreements
between the AIT and CCNAA can be derived from the nature of both orga-
nizations and their linkage to their parent governments.
Given the obvious capacity of the United States to conclude agreements
under international law, the first question in this analysis must be, what is
the current status of Taiwan under international law and what is its capac-
ity to conclude legally cognizable international agreements. Victor Li of
Stanford University has, for one, argued persuasively that Taiwan should
2 3Testimony of Warren Christopher, supra note 17, at 12-14 of transcript.
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be regarded as a "de facto entity with an international personality. 24
Thus, while Taiwan may no longer be regarded by the United States as a de
jure government or a state, Taiwan nevertheless retains the characteristics
of statehood sufficient to qualify itself as a de facto international entity. As
such an entity, Taiwan continues to carry out the full functions of govern-
ment, including the enforcement and conclusion of international agree-
ments.
It is clear that from the perspective of the United States and a majority of
the international community (though twenty-two states still maintain diplo-
matic relations with Taipei) Taiwan is not a state in the legal sense of the
term. Yet a large number of governments carry on trade relations with
Taiwan and otherwise deal with it on a de facto basis. The United States
also continues to deal with Taiwan on a de facto basis, both on a private
level and through the AIT and CCNAA. The TRA affirms this de facto
relationship in Section 3, which provides for the sale to Taiwan of defense
articles and defense services, and in Section 4, which reads in part:
(a) The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the appli-
cation of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the laws of the
United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of
the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979.
(b) The application of subsection (a) of this section shall include, but shall not be
limited to, the following:
(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign coun-
tries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include
and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.
(2) Whenever authorized by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to
conduct or carry out programs, transactions, or other relations with respect to
foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, the President
or any agency of the United States government is authorized to conduct and
carry out, in accordance with section 3305 of this Title, such programs, transac-
tions, and other relations with respect to Taiwan ...
(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in courts in the United States,
in accordance with the laws of the United States, shall not be abrogated,
infringed, modified, denied, or otherwise affected in any way by the absence of
diplomatic relations or recognition.
(8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the laws of the
United States with respect to maintenance of diplomatic relations or recogni-
tion shall be applicable with respect to Taiwan. 25
In addition, under the TRA, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 26 is
held applicable to Taiwan, 27 and the Act of State Doctrine28 is held appli-
2
"See statement of Professor Victor Li, Taiwan.- Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, supra note 5, at 147-53; and L, DE-RECOGNIZING TAIWAN: THE LEGAL
PROBLEMS (1977).2 Taiwan Relations Act, § 4, 22 U.S.C. § 3303, 93 Stat. 15-16 (1979).
2628 U.S.C. § 1602 (1977).
"Letter of Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Adviser Department of State, to Frank Church, Chair-
man, Senate Foreign Relations Comm., February 16, 1979. Taiwan.- Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 5, at 158-61.
281d. The Act of State Doctrine, as formulated in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252
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cable to the acts of the Taiwan government. It is clear, therefore, that the
United States continues to regard Taiwan as a de facto international entity.
International law, too, confirms Taiwan's status as a de facto state.
According to Section 4 of the Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, "Except as otherwise indicated, 'state' as used in the
Restatement of this Subject means an entity that has a defined territory and
population under the control of a government that engages in foreign rela-
tions."' 29 The Montivideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States
also observes that:
Article I. The state as a person of international law should possess the following
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) govern-
ment; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Article III. The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by
other states ...
Article VI. The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recog-
nizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties deter-
mined by international law. 30
There can be little question that Taiwan meets these criteria, and so may
legitimately be described as a de facto state.
United States and international court decisions further hold that de facto
states and their acts may be given legal recognition, even in the absence of
formal diplomatic relations. In Wufsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated
Soviet Republic,3' the court, referring to the then-unrecognized Soviet gov-
ernment, said:
The R.S.F.S.R. is the existing de facto government of Russia. . . .Whether or
not a government exists, clothed with the power to enforce its authority within its
own territory, obeyed by the people over whom it rules, capable of performing
the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an independent power, able to enforce
its claims by military force, is a fact, not a theory. For its recognition does not
create the state, although it may be desirable.
In Salimoff v. Standard Oil Company of New York, 32 the court, in applying
(1897), states that: "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory". The doctrine is subject to some modifi-
cation since passage of the "Sabbatino Amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22
U.S.C. 2370(e) (2) (1976), which states that "no court in the United States shall decline on the
ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect
to the principles of international law" in cases of foreign expropriation occurring after Jan-
uary 1, 1959, except where the President's determination that application of the Act of State
Doctrine is required by foreign policy considerations. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
29RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 4 (1965).
'"Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. 881 (1933).3
1Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24
(1923).
3 2Salimoff v. Standard Oil Company of New York, 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
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the Act of State Doctrine to a confiscatory decree of the still-unrecognized
Soviet government, asked:
As a juristic conception, what is Soviet Russia? A band of robbers or a govern-
ment? We all know that it is a government. The State Department knows it, the
courts, the nations, and the man in the street. If it is a government in fact, its
decrees have force within its borders and over its nationals. . . . The courts may
not recognize the Soviet government as the de jure government until the State
Department gives the word. They may, however, say that it is a government,
maintaining internal peace and order, providing for national defense and the gen-
eral welfare, carrying on relations with our government and others.
The court's opinion in the leading case of Upright v. Mercury Business
Machines,33 similarly held that:
A foreign government, although not recognized by the political arm of the United
States government, may nevertheless have a de facto existence which is juridically
cognizable. . . . The lack of jural status for such government or its creature cor-
poration is not determinative of whether transactions with it will be denied
enforcement in American courts, so long as the government is not the suitor ...
Affirming the jural recognition given the acts of politically unrecognized
governments, the Tinoco Claims Arbitration (Great Britain v. Costa Rica)34
was decided according to the same principles. In that case, Chief Justice
Taft found that the thirty-month government of Fredrico Tinoco in Costa
Rica, though unrecognized by the United States, was nevertheless a de facto
government, and that its acts therefore were judicially cognizable.
Thus, the existence of a state depends not on its legal recognition by other
governments, but rather on its inherent capacity to function and exercise
authority within and outside its own territory. Taiwan clearly meets the
criteria established by international law for status as a de facto state. Its
acts therefore may be given legal recognition by courts in the application of
United States and international law.
More immediately, the absence of United States diplomatic recognition
does not impair Taiwan's capacity "to enter into relations with other
states". While having no de jure international status in United States eyes,
Taiwan nevertheless qualifies as a de facto state, and as such is legally capa-
ble under international law to enter into foreign relations. 35 While the
absence of formal recognition witholds from Taiwan the international legal
status with its commensurate "rights and duties" which recognition nor-
mally entails, this does not preclude the conclusion of international agree-
ments by Taiwan, or the recognition of those agreements in international
"Upright v. Mercury Business Machines, 13 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1961).
3
"Tinoco Claims Arbitration (Great Britain v. Costa Rica), 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147 (1924), 1
U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 369.
"Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, Taiwan continues to have not only the
power to enter into foreign relations, but also the obligations of a state under international law.
Section 108 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1965) states: "An entity not recognized as a state but meeting the requirements for
recognition specified in § 100, or a state whose regime is not recognized as its government, has
the obligations of a state under international law in relation to a non-recognizing state ......
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law. This principle is affirmed in Article 74 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties36 which declares that, "[t]he severance or absence of
diplomatic or consular relations between two or more States does not pre-
vent the conclusion of treaties between those states. .. ."
The question which then follows is: given the legal capacity of both the
United States and Taiwan to conclude international agreements, what is the
international legal status of agreements made between their representative
entities, the AIT and CCNAA? As unofficial entities, neither organization
has the legal authority to conclude a treaty in the formal sense of the
term.37 The AIT and CCNAA may, however, have the authority to con-
clude international agreements.
In a memorandum dated March 12, 1976, Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser
to the State Department, established criteria for the guidance of State
Department personnel in deciding what constitutes an "international agree-
ment". These are: (1) the intention of the parties to be bound in interna-
tional law ("The central requirement is that the parties intend their
undertaking to be of legal, and not merely of political or personal effect.
Documents intended to have political or moral weight, but not intended to
be legally binding, are not international agreements. . . ."); (2) significance
of the arrangement (". . . [Mlinor trivial undertakings, even if couched in
legal language, do not constitute international agreements."); (3) requisite
specificity, including objective criteria for determining enforceability
("International agreements require a certain precision and specificity setting
forth the legally binding undertakings of the parties."); (4) the necessity for
two or more parties to the arrangement ("While unilateral commitments on
occasion may be legally binding and may be significant in international
relations, they do not constitute international agreements."); and (5) form
("While form as such is not normally an important factor in the law of
treaties and international agreements, it does deserve some weight ...
Failure to use the customary form may on occasion constitute evidence of a
lack of intent to be legally bound by the arrangement. On the other hand, if
the general content and context reveals an intention to enter into a legally
binding relationship, the lack of proper form will not be decisive."). In the
context of form, the Leigh Memorandum also discusses agency-to-agency
agreements, commenting that "[d]espite variations in prior practice, it is
currently our position that agency level agreements are international agree-
ments for purposes of publication and transmittal to the Congress if they
meet the above criteria. . . . What is important is the substance of the
agreement. '38
3 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969), 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679 (1969).
"The Harvard Research in International Law, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 686 (1935), defines in
Article 1 a "treaty" as "a formal instrument of agreement by which two or more States estab-
lish or seek to establish a relation under international law between themselves."
38DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (E. McDowell ed. 1976).
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Agreements between the AIT and CCNAA, whether in the form of a
letter of understanding or a full textual agreement, will in all probability
conform to the above criteria. The Leigh Memorandum's reference to
agency level agreements is particularly significant in its suggestion that
international agreements need not take place at a formal government-to-
government level, but instead may occur on significantly lower planes,
which is to say, international agreements may be entered into by organiza-
tions not traditionally thought of as representatives of states.
In the context of United States-Taiwan relations, it is clear that the AIT
and CCNAA are not "agencies" of their respective governments in the
same sense as are mainline ministries and departments. This is clear from
the statute. Nevertheless, the AIT and CCNAA might well be considered
"agencies" of their parent governments in the sense that they represent the
interests of those governments in dealings with each other. Support for this
agency relationship can be found in the legal charter given both organiza-
tions by the United States and Taiwan governments, as well as in their gov-
ernmental sources of financing. Strong support can also be found in the
Articles of Incorporation of the AIT, which empower the Institute to "rep-
resent the interests of the United States" and to "perform functions, on
behalf of the American people, that would otherwise be performed by gov-
ernment."'39 It is clear from the practical functioning of both organizations,
moreover, that the AIT and CCNAA do in fact act as representatives of the
American and Taiwan governments, in that both governments accept the
legal consequences and benefits of their agreements.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 40 legally recog-
nized "international agreements" may exist between states and "other sub-
jects of international law that are not states, or between such "other subjects
of international law" themselves. According to Article 3, titled "Interna-
tional agreements not within the scope of the present articles,"
The fact that the present articles do not relate:
(a) To international agreements concluded between states and other subjects of
international law or between such other subjects of international law; or
(b) To international agreements not in written form shall not affect the legal
force of such agreements or the application to them of any of the rules set forth in
the present articles to which they would be subject independently of these arti-
cles.4 1
The International Law Commission (ILC) Commentary on Article 3
points out that because Article 2 defines "treaty" as "an international agree-
ment between states," this provision was intended to correct any impression
that "international agreements between a state and an international organi-
zation or other subject of international law, or between two other non-statal
subjects of international law, are outside the purview of the law of treaties."
91d at 4.
"63 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 875 (1969), 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679 (1969).
"Art. 3.
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It appears from both the Commentary and from the legislative history of
the Convention that when drafting this provision the ILC was primarily
concerned with the case of international organizations. The early legisla-
tive history of Article 3 indicates that the participants also had in mind the
status of the Holy See and of governments of insurgent communities recog-
nized as belligerents, as well as of dependent states and of novel entities
such as the European Economic Community. Rather than attempt to lay
out clear lines for the rules affecting such entities, the view was expressed in
debate that the article should avoid specificity and restrict itself to "more
general, if less informative terms". 42
As Article 3 underwent later refinements, debate reflected general agree-
ment that the intent of the article was to make clear that the fact that Article
2 limited the scope of the Treaty to treaties between States was not in any
way intended to deny that other subjects of international law have the
capacity to conclude treaties. Article 3 made clear, moreover, that the rules
of customary international law continued to apply to agreements falling
outside the scope of the convention.
43
As a de facto state and a subject of international law, international agree-
ments made by Taiwan must fall under the terms of Article 2, or in the
alternative of Article 3, and are therefore governed by international law.
The AIT and CCNAA as representative, though unofficial, agencies of the
United States and Taiwan, benefit from lines of authority from their respec-
tive governments which, it may be argued, qualify them for the status of
"other non-statal subjects of international law." The function and responsi-
bility of both organizations appear to be commensurate with this designa-
tion. Though the AIT and CCNAA are unique in international experience,
the broad terms of Article 3 of the Vienna Convention clearly leave room
for such an interpretation.
Conclusion
Taiwan, though denied legal recognition by the United States, neverthe-
less remains a de facto state and a juridically cognizable international
entity. As such it has the capacity to conclude legally binding international
agreements under international law.
Though publicly held to be unofficial, the AIT and CCNAA nevertheless
function as agents of their respective governments, having been assigned
that status under the domestic law of both countries. Under international
law, international agreements may be concluded between entities other
than states, a category which may be flexibly defined. Based on their
"
2[19621 I Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N at 57-64.
3United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Vienna, 26 March-24
May 1968, Official Records (New York: United Nations, 1969), pp. 36-46.
